

AD-A219 845

**STUDY
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID M. EMLING, OD

Approved for public release
distribution unlimited.

DTIC
ELECTE
MAR 30 1990
S B D

12 FEBRUARY 1990



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

90 03 30 030

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Role of Congress in the Acquisition Process.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Lieutenant Colonel David M. Emling		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013-5050		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 12 February 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 32
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The Constitution empowers the Congress with raising and supporting Armies and making all laws which shall be necessary. This power is manifested in the annual budget process as one of their major roles. The authorization and appropriation process is the means by which the Defense Department obtains new items of equipment. The oversight role emanates from the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, which requires all congressional committees (continued)		

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

to conduct oversight of all agencies and programs under their jurisdiction. The magnitude and impact of these roles has grown over the years. This paper analyzes how the Defense Department determines the need for a new item of equipment and the functions that these two roles play in changing or bringing these programs to fruition. In that vein, the impacts of these two roles are reviewed and some specific examples are cited. As monetary resources dwindle, the importance of these roles and their effect on the acquisition process will continue to grow. Consequently, some conclusions have been drawn and six recommendations are provided for consideration.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

LTC David M. Emling, OD

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
12 February 1990

UNCLASSIFIED

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC David M. Emling, OD

TITLE: The Role of Congress in the Acquisition Process

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 12 February 1990 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Constitution empowers the Congress with raising and supporting Armies and making all laws which shall be necessary. This power is manifested in the annual budget process as one of their major roles. The authorization and appropriation process is the means by which the Defense Department obtains new items of equipment. The oversight role emanates from the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, which requires all congressional committees to conduct oversight of all agencies and programs under their jurisdiction. The magnitude and impact of these roles has grown over the years. This paper analyzes how the Defense Department determines the need for a new item of equipment and the functions that these two roles play in changing or bringing these programs to fruition. In that vein, the impacts of these two roles are reviewed and some specific examples are cited. As monetary resources dwindle, the importance of these roles and their effect on the acquisition process will continue to grow. Consequently, some conclusions have been drawn and six recommendations are provided for consideration.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.....	ii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS.....	3
General.....	3
New Materiel.....	5
III. THE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS	7
IV. OVERSIGHT.....	16
V. IMPACTS.....	19
Authorizations and Appropriations.....	19
Oversight.....	20
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	23
Conclusions.....	23
Recommendations.....	25
ENDNOTES.....	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	28

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution provides Congress the power to; "raise and support Armies ...", "provide and maintain a Navy", and "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and Naval Forces ...; provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States...". 1/ Additionally, that same Article empowers Congress "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ...". 2/ Webster defines the word raise as; "to bring into being: cause to arise or appear; to bring together: collect, gather, levy" and the word support as; "to promote the interests or cause of", and "to pay the costs of". 3/ Can it be, that when our forefathers framed this particular Article of the Constitution, they envisioned that the members of Congress would become so involved in carrying out this power that they would be concerned with individual weapons or weapon systems? If one takes the meaning of the words literally, it can be perceived that the intent was to form an Army and Navy and fund them to perform their functions in

accordance with the necessary and proper laws. Thus was born a role for Congress in the military acquisition process. This paper will address two roles of Congress; the authorization and appropriation process and oversight, their impact and recommendations for dealing with them.

CHAPTER II

DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS

GENERAL

What is the process by which the Department of Defense and Congress determine what is needed and what should be acquired for the Services? To provide an understanding of the process, the Army system for determining requirements will be used as a basis. While the systems differ among the Services, the end product, a Department of Defense budget submission is the same.

The Army begins its process by using a system called the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS). This system and the results are the responsibility of the Army's combat developer, the Training and Doctrine command. The CBRS is a process by which doctrine, training, organization, and materiel are reviewed for deficiencies in terms of the Army's ability to meet and defeat the current threat. Thus the current threat, in conjunction with the National Military Strategy, are the starting points for the process. The process starts by analyzing the current threat to determine how the Army will fight in the future. This analysis serves as the basis for the Army's missions and roles. Technology plays an equally important role with the threat in

determining how the Army will fight. Once the overall fighting concept is formulated, the functional proponents (e.g. Armor School, Infantry School, Ordnance Center and School, etc.) are responsible for developing how each branch will perform its mission within that concept. In developing these operational concepts, each of the functional proponents performs Mission Area Analyses which identify existing deficiencies in their ability to perform these missions. The deficiencies are then analyzed to determine the most effective and economic solution. The priority of solutions are 1) a change in doctrine; 2) new or additional training; 3) a change in organizational structure; 4) product improving an existing weapon system; 5) acquiring a nondevelopmental item; and 6) the development of a new item of materiel. Making the development of a new weapon system the last priority helps to ensure the most economical solution.

These identified deficiencies and the accompanying solutions are prioritized by the functional proponents and then melded by TRADOC into the Battlefield Development Plan (BDP). This plan integrates the efforts of all the functional proponents to support current and future Army missions. In essence, it begins the justification of new doctrine, training, organization or materiel development.

NEW MATERIEL

Since the focus of this paper is on acquisition, it will only discuss the remainder of the system as it relates to the solutions requiring materiel development. Prior to 1986, the BDP initiated a documentation process which was encumbered with coordination and approval requirements. In an effort to streamline the acquisition process, the BDP now serves as the basis for the Army's Long-Range Research, Development and Acquisition Plan (LRRDAP). The LRRDAP covers 15 years and is the prioritized plan which contributes to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.

From this point, all new systems require an Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan and a Required Operational Capability (ROC) to begin the acquisition process. Additionally, systems designated as DOD major systems (e.g. costs greater than \$200 million for research, development, test and evaluation or greater than \$1 billion in procurement) and HQDA designated acquisition programs require a Justification for Major System New Start (JMSNS). A new document, the Operational Needs Statement (ONS), is submitted to detail the user's operational need for this new item to correct a deficiency in mission accomplishment. Depending upon the level of funding required for the system, initiation of the program is approved by various levels ranging from the TRADOC Commander to the Secretary of Defense.

I have chosen to elaborate on this process beginning with CBRS through to program approval to illustrate the effort that goes into developing the requirement for a new weapon system. As I hope you can see, the need for a new item of materiel is well analyzed, scrutinized and planned. The need is soundly based on threat and technology as well as economy and efficiency. The approval process entails stringent questioning and justification by professionals who are familiar with the need as well as the stated required operational capability. The final approval, however, rests with Congress, since DOD cannot expend any money for the research, development, and acquisition of weapon systems unless Congress 1) authorizes the specific program, and 2) appropriates funds for that specific program. One begins to see the scope of the role of Congress in the acquisition process.

CHAPTER III

THE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS

As previously mentioned, the Constitution gave Congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary ..." 4/ In 1921, "the House of Representatives made a rule that appropriations could not be recommended by the Appropriations Committee for purposes not authorized by law. Similarly, another rule prohibited the substantive committees (e.g. Armed Services) from including appropriations in their reported authorization bills." 5/ From this nominal beginning, the process evolved into a distinct two step process with the passage of seven pieces of legislation beginning in 1959.

1959 - Public Law 86-149 required authorization for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels.

1962 - Public Law 87-436 requires authorization for all research, development, testing or evaluation of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels.

1963 - Public Law 88-174 requires authorization for all research, development, testing or evaluation carried on by the Department of Defense.

1965 - Public Law 89-37 requires authorization for the procurement of tracked combat vehicles.

1967 - Public Law 90-168 requires annual authorization of the personnel strengths of each of the Reserve components as a prior condition for the appropriation of funds for the pay and allowances for the Reserve components.

1969 - Public Law 91-121 requires authorization for the procurement of other weapons for the use of any armed force of the United States. (Essentially this covers heavy, medium and light artillery; anti-aircraft artillery; rifles, machine guns; mortars, small arms weapons; and any crew-fired piece using fixed ammunition.)

1970 - Public Law 91-441 requires authorization for the procurement of torpedoes and related support equipment; also requires authorization of the average annual active duty personnel strength for each component of the Armed Forces as a condition precedent to the appropriation of funds for this purpose. 6/

In addition to creating the two step process, a review of these laws clearly indicates a much greater involvement by Congress in the acquisition process.

It is important here that a clear distinction be made between authorization and appropriation. From the book, Arming America: How the US Buys Weapons, comes a concise explanation:

"Before the Department of Defense can spend money for research, development, or production of weapon systems, Congress must: (1) grant it authority to carry on specific programs, and (2) appropriate funds to pay for each authorized activity. Two separate pieces of legislation are required. In its annual Defense Authorization Bill, Congress states which new programs, from among those proposed by the Defense Department, will be initiated, and which ongoing programs will be continued. In its annual Defense Appropriations Bill, Congress grants "obligational authority" to the Defense Department; that is, the authority to pay out funds, or to contract ("obligate" funds) for each of the activities approved in the Authorization Bill. Although the funds allotted for individual weapon systems approved in the Authorization Bill may be reduced or

increased in the Appropriations Bill, no money may be appropriated for unauthorized weapon systems. Nor may Defense Department officials, military or civilian, initiate or continue unauthorized programs. During the course of the fiscal year, the Defense Department may, however, request Congress to authorize new or lapsed programs and to increase appropriations for programs already authorized." 7/

Since most congressional efforts are accomplished by committee, it is important at this juncture that we look at these committees and how they do business. As of November 1986, there are 16 standing committees in the Senate, 22 in the House, plus 5 select or special committees in the Senate and 4 in the House. In addition to these 47, there are 4 joint committees for a total of 51. This constitutes a reduction in the number of committees over the last twenty years. While Congress has made an effort to reduce the number of committees, the number of subcommittees has grown. Presently, there are over 110 Senate subcommittees and over 150 House subcommittees. This relates to numerous hours of hearings and testimony in which DOD representatives must participate. "Before the Pentagon stopped counting in 1983, Defense Department witnesses in one year logged 1,453 hours of testimony before 91 congressional committees and subcommittees. During the

same year, the military responded to 84,148 written queries from Capitol Hill and 592,150 telephone requests." 8/

In addition to the committees and subcommittees, Congressional staffs have also grown. Since 1970 the number of Congressional staff members has more than doubled from around 10,000 to over 20,000. While not all are located in Washington, DC, many actively participate in budget issues and are the origin of the queries and telephone calls previously mentioned. The Defense Department is not concerned with all committees, subcommittees, and Congressional staffs, but deals primarily with the four "Defense Committees" and their staffs. These are the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC), House Armed Services Committee (HASC), and the House Appropriations Committee (HAC). There are in excess of 20 subcommittees and/or panels relating to these four committees which must be dealt with annually.

The machinations by which Congress authorizes programs and appropriates funding annually is known as the Congressional Budget Process. The process begins in January of each year with the submission of the President's Budget. The Department of Defense portion of that budget began with the Concept Based Requirements System discussed in chapter 2 and eventually translated into budget line items. Theoretically, the authorization step must be completed before the appropriation process can begin. As previously mentioned, by law, no money can be appropriated for an unauthorized program.

The authorization process consists of 3 components, approval of: 1) a program (research, development, testing, evaluation, or acquisition of a system or item, 2) a funding ceiling for that program (total amount which may be spent), and 3) quantities to be acquired. The HASC and the SASC along with their associated subcommittees conduct this process through a series of hearings. Generally, several types of hearings are conducted. Initially, the hearings address the broader scope of the threat, warfighting capability, force levels, etc. At these hearings, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of the military services may testify. At this point, the Battlefield Development Plan plays an important role for the Army in supporting future missions and strategy. Subsequently, detailed reviews of individual line items are conducted by the same committees. At these hearings, personnel more familiar with the individual programs, such as the Program Manager, may be called to testify. Congress can do many things to a given line item. They may approve it as submitted for the year in which the Army intended, change the funding ceiling, change the quantity, change the years in which the requested activity may occur or any combination of three components. The final possibility is to not grant authorization for the program which means, under the laws, that no money may be appropriated. At the conclusion of the subcommittee and committee process, both the HASC and the SASC report their action to the full House and Senate. Here the items are debated by the

respective members and eventually agreement is reached. Since the authorization bills passed by the House and Senate are different, they are sent to one of the joint committees, the Authorization Conference Committee. Here, the differences between the two bills are reconciled and the final bill is signed into law by the President. The Defense Department now has its authorization.

The second step of the process is the appropriations process. While similar to the authorization process, there are several differences. First, this step in the process is controlled by the HAC and SAC and their respective subcommittees. There are six major appropriations in which DOD is involved. For purposes of simplicity, I will only discuss here the DOD Appropriations Bill which provides funding for major items of equipment and weapons systems. Several types of hearings are again held. In appropriation hearings though, because they evaluate dollar amounts versus individual programs, they begin with questions regarding fiscal policy. For these hearings, members of the Executive Branch (Secretary of Treasury, Director of the Office of Management and Budget) are called to testify. Subsequent hearings are then held with the top service officials to defend their portions of the President's Budget. These committees may either add, cut, or approve as written, the requests for money. As with the authorization process, when the subcommittees complete their hearings, the full committee debates the issues until an agreement is reached. These bills are then presented to the full House and Senate, debated, and agreement is reached.

The second joint committee with which we are concerned, the Appropriations Conference Committee, reconciles the differences and presents a bill to the President for signature.

Since at the conclusion of this two step process, many changes may have been made to what was originally submitted, an additional process is included. This process is what is known as the Congressional Appeals Process. This process provides DOD a final opportunity to rebut any changes made by any or all of the four standing committees (HASC/SASC/HAC/SAC). The appeal may submit additional justification, provide clarification or rebut a committees position on either authorizations or appropriations. All appeals are submitted through the Comptroller and follow this chain:

<u>An appeal of</u>	<u>is made to</u>
HASC changes	SASC
SASC and HASC changes	Authorization Conference Committee
HAC change	SAC
SAC and HAC changes	Appropriations Conference Committee

While purposefully keeping simple what is really a complex process, the foregoing depicts a role of Congress in the acquisition process. What started as a well conceived, justified plan, may now require many changes due to authorization, funding, or

personal considerations. Another role of Congress goes hand-in-hand with the authorization and appropriation role. That role is termed oversight.

CHAPTER IV

OVERSIGHT

The 1946 Legislative Reorganization requires all congressional committees to conduct oversight of all agencies and programs under their jurisdiction. A committee that "reports out" a piece of legislation (takes it to the full Senate or House for a vote) has oversight in that area. 9/ While this prerogative of Congressional Committees has been around for some time, its employment has grown in recent years. As the number of congressional Subcommittees and the size of Congressional staffs has grown, so too has the amount of oversight. The Defense Department owns a share of the responsibility for this growth. As fraud, waste and abuse was discovered in transactions, Congress desired to help fix these problems. As one Congressman put it, "I think they can use some outside help," he said, "particularly if it comes free." 10/

Some would question whether this help has been "free" or if it actually hinders the acquisition process. Beginning in the 1970's, requests by Congress for special studies and additional justifications for budget started to increase. While many were pertinent to the overall national defense and a common sense approach to oversight, others were dubious at best. In a 1985 article, Mr. Fred Hiatt of the "Washington Post" reported that

one such study was required by Congress to determine whether Officer's Clubs should serve margarine, butter, or both. Others covered such vital topics as "Military Jacket Linings", "Protection of Marine Corps' Name and Insignia", and a report on "Hawaiian Milk". 11/ Accompanying the 1985 Defense Department budget request, which itself contained some 20,000 pages of justification, were 440 reports and 247 studies which had been requested by the various committees.

In addition to requiring reports and studies, the advent of "spare parts horror stories" launched Congress into a legislative frenzy to fix the problems. This period of acquisition process reform began in 1983 in lesser proportions but has grown steadily. In 1984 alone, the Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act, the Defense Procurement Reform Act, the Small Business and Federal Procurement Competition Enhancement Act and a host of others. The second session of Congress in 1985, produced about 150 pieces of legislation all relating to changes in the manner in which the Defense Department conducts acquisition. In 1986, one of 170 reforms proposed by the House required reports on all government contracts signed by businesses on Indian reservations. While Congress thought they were trying to help, others viewed it differently.

In a report by the Government Accounting Office entitled, "Why Some Weapon Systems Encounter Production Problems", the following comments were made. "It is hard not to notice that the Weapons that encounter the most problems, such as the Army's

Copperhead projectile and the Navy's Tomahawk missile, are the ones Congress has been most involved in designing." 12/

Not only has Congress played a role in deciding what and how many items the Defense Department may acquire, but the oversight role has added sufficient legislation to direct how and in some cases from where it will be acquired. No other government in the world has shown as much interest in its' weapon systems acquisition process. Is all of this help really "free"? A few examples in the next chapter will provide some insights into what the previously mentioned Congressman defines as "free".

CHAPTER V

IMPACTS

AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS

As in other sectors of the economy, prices in the Defense industry have a tendency to escalate while decisions are being made. Failure to decide on and commit to a program when initially proposed have forced the Defense Department into paying higher prices for several systems. One example is the MX missile in a railroad basing mode. When initially proposed in 1978, 200 MX missiles, in this basing mode, cost \$30 billion or about \$150 million each. While Congress debated on the correct basing mode, prices escalated. After some 200 votes on how this missile should be based, the unit cost in the new basing mode was \$600 million each.

The B-1 Bomber was priced at \$41 million each in 1970, rose to \$87 million in 1977 and was purchased in 1984 for \$220 million each.

While not all of these increases are directly attributable to Congressional action or inaction, many of them are. One of the primary contributing factors is changes in production quantities. From 1979 to 1982, the authorized quantities for Navy

ties. From 1979 to 1982, the authorized quantities for Navy Tomahawk missiles went from 1,082 to 251, back to 439, to 644 in 1981, ending with a quantity of 3,994. The Army's Copperhead projectile started with a plan for 132,000, dropped to a low of 9,000 and ultimately settled at 30,812. These drastic changes result in increased costs due to production line changes, retooling costs and personnel turbulence. During the budget process for FY84, the House changed 1,190 of the 1,860 budget line items submitted and the Senate changed 1,160. The Senate version of the 1986 defense budget included \$60 million for 150 Captor Mines. The Navy had requested none, insisting that the 1750 it had were sufficient. Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) insisted that the mines would be a wise addition to the Navy's inventory. Captor mines are manufactured in Ohio. 13/

OVERSIGHT

The process for acquiring Defense materiel has always been a cumbersome one at best. As incidents of fraud, waste and abuse rose, so too did the amount of legislation aimed at eliminating it. The 1983 reforms, coupled with the plethora of new rules, passed in 1984, which were previously mentioned, were all intended to make the acquisition system better and to eliminate fraud, waste and abuse. While some of the goals were accomplished, other impacts resulted which may indicate that Congressional oversight sometimes creates as many problems as it solves. For

mented in 1984 lengthened the time from order placement to parts bin from 58 days to 159 days for one Air Force part. Obviously, when more time from order to bin is required, a greater quantity of that part is necessary. Unless the new rules sufficiently affect the unit price of that part to offset the increase in quantity, waste, now mandated by law, has occurred.

In another example, Section 203 of Public Law 91-441 changed the manner in which the government reimbursed contractors for Defense related research. This change was necessitated to insure that the Defense Department was not wasting money. In order to comply with the rigorous guidelines set forth in the law, the Defense Department had to employ 7 technical reviewers, 12 negotiators, 11 on-site reviewers, 18 technical evaluators, 15 administrators, 6 documenters and 17 auditors. The estimated cost for these additional 86 people and their function is \$4.6 million. In addition, the research industry, as an entity, estimated they would add some 1,525 new people, at a cost of \$93 million, to comply with the new provisions of the law. 14/ These costs are all passed on to the consumer (Defense Department) when contracts are awarded. The new provisions of this law would have to eliminate nearly \$100 million in waste just to break even.

To balance the scales, it should not be misinterpreted that all the legislation passed as a result of the Congressional oversight function has been wasteful. There are many documented savings that have resulted. The point to be made in all of this

is that when well researched, adequately planned changes are implemented by knowledgeable people, those changes can be beneficial. When changes are the result of other interests or pressures, or are implemented with only cursory thought, the fix can end up costing more than the problem. When this occurs, help ceases to be "free" and becomes extremely expensive.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

As available dollar resources continue to dwindle, those that are authorized and appropriated for the Defense Department will follow the same slope. If we are to remain a nation capable of reacting to threats around the world with fewer dollars, they obviously will have to be spent more wisely. The Concepts Based Requirements System provides a long range plan for remedies of mission accomplishment deficiencies in terms of doctrine, training, organization and materiel. The difficulty arises in the implementation of that plan. As the examples pointed out, changes to that plan either in terms of quantity, item, or time frame become very expensive and disruptive. This paper has not even addressed the internal perturbations that are caused in training, spare parts, personnel turmoil, etc. Scrutiny of the budget in and of itself is not necessarily harmful. Scrutiny by individuals who are not knowledgeable regarding military missions, equipment capabilities and warfighting tactics usually results in less than the desired outcome. A present trend, in

Congress and the general public, is one of fewer and fewer members with military experience. As the military forces grow smaller, this trend will increase at a more rapid pace. This trend mandates that the Defense Department do the best possible job of educating the decision makers and properly justifying their needs.

On the other hand, decisions need to be made on a timely basis, commitments made and then stick to them. A process, such as the authorization and appropriation process, that is designed to be completed between January and September each year must be completed on time. Enduring continuing resolutions annually, which restrict spending to the prior year's levels, is disruptive in the industrial sector. Other national governments have recognized this and have changed to a longer duration budget cycle. Most European democracies grant Parliamentary approval of a five year plan while their annual review focus is on year six. This enables them to obtain materiel at more affordable costs and can be cost competitive in world markets.

The possibility that the amount of Congressional oversight will be reduced is not plausible. Perhaps, the oversight role should remain at the same level to preclude recurrences of fraud, waste and abuse. If the decision makers were better educated in the Defense acquisition process, more knowledgeable reform decisions could be made. It is obvious from the examples provided that some of the existing reforms need to be revised. Additionally, changes to the budget review cycle, and honoring commit-

ments previously made by Congress, would automatically reduce the amount of oversight necessary. The desire for Congressmen to respond to constituency pressures will remain and mandates a more understandable justification to and better education of the general public in terms of military requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The existing system of requirements development used by the Army, CBRs, must be retained. Additional efforts must be made by the Defense Department to educate decision makers on war fighting tactics, roles and missions and equipment capabilities. It is especially important that justifications for new materiel be accurate, complete and understandable.

While progress towards a longer budget cycle is apparent today, it is insufficient. Instead of the two year budget presently proposed, our government should adopt an approach similar to the five year cycle that exists in Europe. Additionally, reprogramming (changing items or quantities for a given program) should only be permitted based upon drastic threat changes or significant technological breakthroughs. This will clearly demonstrate a willingness to make commitments and stick to them. Lessening program perturbations will take maximum advantage of continuous production cost savings.

A review of the present acquisition rules should be conducted similar to previous efforts like the Packard Commission. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition recently announced

the formation of a regulatory relief task force. The goal of this task force is to review all acquisition regulations from the bottom up and eliminate anything that is nonessential. 15/ I would recommend that the task force use cost effectiveness as one of the measures of essentiality.

While some redundant hearings and requirements for studies will be eliminated by a longer budget cycle, all such activity that cannot be directly attributed to a major weapon system should be eliminated.

Finally, the process already begun to streamline and simplify the acquisition process must continue. A simpler, easier system would be more easily understood by the decision makers and the general public.

ENDNOTES

1. The Constitution of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 7.
2. Ibid.
3. Websters Third New International Dictionary, G & C Merriam Company, Springfield, Mass., 1965, p. 1877.
4. The Constitution of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 7.
5. Allsbrook, John W., Major USAF, "Role of Congressional Staff in the Weapon System Acquisition Process, Study Project Report, PMC 76-2, pp. 5-6.
6. Fox, J. Ronald, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 122.
7. Ibid.
8. Hiatt, Fred and Atkinson, Rick, "To Pentagon, Oversight Has Become Overkill", "The Washington Post", 4 July, 1985, p. A1.
9. "Congressional Involvement and Relations - A Guide for Department of Defense Program Managers, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA, Nov. 1986, p. 60.
10. Fosssdal, Gregory A., "The Military - Congressional Complex", "The Wall Street Journal", 8 Aug. 1985, p. 22.
11. Hiatt, Fred and Atkinson, Rick, "To Pentagon, Oversight Has Become Overkill", "The Washington Post", 4 July 1985, p. A1.
12. Fosssdal, Gregory A., "The Military - Congressional Complex", "The Wall Street Journal", 8 Aug. 1985, p. 22.
13. Hiatt, Fred and Atkinson, Rick, "To Pentagon Oversight Has Become Overkill", "The Washington Post", 4 July 1985, p. A12.
14. Ibid.
15. Betti, John A., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, "The Mandate for Cultural Change in the Acquisition Process", "Defense 89", November/December 1989, pp. 8-12.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Allsbrook, John W., Major, USAF, "Role of Congressional Staff in the Weapon System Acquisition Process", Study Project Report, PMC 76-2, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA, November 1976.
2. Apicella, Frank J., "Congress and Army Operational Test and Evaluation", USAWC Military Studies Program Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 10 April 1989.
3. Baker, Robert M., LTC, USA, "Chopping Back, The Systems Acquisition Process, "Program Manager", September-October 1987, p. 20.
4. Betti, John A., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, "The Mandate for Cultural Change in the Acquisition Process", "Defense 89", November/December 1989.
5. Boger, Dan C., Greer, Willis R. Jr., Liao, Shu S., "Competitive Weapon Systems Acquisition: Myths and Facts", Department of Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1989.
6. Bongiovi, Robert P., LTC, USAF, "The Role of the OJCS in Weapon System Acquisition", Executive Research Project, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 1988.
7. "Congressional Involvement and Relations - A Guide for Department of Defense Program Managers", Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA, November 1986.
8. Constitution of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.
9. Fossedal, Gregory A., "The Military - Congressional Complex", "The Wall Street Journal", New York City, NY, 8 August 1985.
10. Fox, J. Ronald, Arming America: How the U. S. Buys Weapons, Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1974.
11. Hiatt, Fred and Atkinson, Rick, "To Pentagon, Oversight Has Become Overkill", "The Washington Post", Washington, DC, 4 July 1985.
12. Medalia, Jonathan E., "Congress and the Political Guidance of Weapons Procurement", "Naval War College Review", Naval War College, Newport, RI, Fall 1975.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (Cont)

13. Korb, Lawrence J., "Congressional Impact On Defense Spending, 1962-1973: The Programmatic and Fiscal Hypotheses", "Naval War College Review", Naval War College, Newport, RI, November-December 1973.

14. Owens, Mackubin Thomas, Dr., "Congress' Role in Defense Management", "Armed Forces Journal International", Washington, DC, April 1985.

15. Rich, Michael D., "Competition in the Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems: Legislative Perspectives", United States Air Force Project Rand, R-2058-PR, November 1976.

16. Smith, Hedrick, The Power Game, How Washington Works, Ballantine Books, New York, June 1989.

17. Stubbing, Richard A. with Mendel, Richard A., The Defense Game, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1986.

18. Trimble, Robert F., "Government Procurement Reforms - The Need to Consider Long-Term Effects", "Program Manager", DSMC, Fort Belvoir, VA, November-December 1987.

19. Wydler, Virginia L., "Reports to Congress Relative to Major Weapon Systems Acquisition: Their Impact on the Acquisition Process", Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, September 1986.